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Stare Decisis and the
Ohio Supreme Court
Robert D. Archibald
44JuDGES are human beings and like the rest of us they are subject
to human limitations." This statement does not shock us today, although
not so many years ago, as humanity goes, it might have. We have come
a long way from the era of classic natural law when the rules which
guided human conduct or at least settled human conflicts were thought
to have come straight from God, or at least from an unbelievably mystic
reason somehow working through man, man who was not the law-giver
but only the law-receiver.
Now we know. Now
Ti-m AUTHOR (A.B., 1953 College of Wooster; we admit that judges make
LLB., 1956 Western Reserve) is a practicing the law, make it in the
lawyer in Cleveland, Ohio. sense that they must wres-
tle with a fresh problem
in each piece of litigation
coming before them and come up with a decision for the parties involved
as well as some bit of wisdom which may help future judges in some
other problem situation.1
In the midst of this comparatively new-found wisdom, we have dis-
covered, moreover, that a judge may draw upon many sources to aid him
in making his decision. We have learned to view the judge against his
complex background of society where various events occur in varying
degrees of complexity and where various theories have been drawn up to
explain those events and their intermeshings. Since the judge and the
litigational situation he faces are products of that complex background,
how that judge reacts to that situation can realistically be explained only
in terms of psychology, semantics and science, to name only a few of the
sources of a judicial decision which are recognized by today's sociological
jurisprudents.
Judicial opinions must still, of course, be included as a legitimate and
significant source of later decisions. On the other hand, to what extent
is such precedent decisive? The answer suggests the paradox which is
the basis of this article and its study. While we are all, as legal profes-
sionals, aware in our abstract discussions that there is more to judicial
'See Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932).
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decision-making than discovery of precedents, we continue in every way
to give the lie to that wisdom. We seem actually to hold precedent and
particularly stare decisis in an aura of holiness, the place once reserved
for "reason" and then later, judges. Such an attitude is manifested by
the expectancy of many an attorney of victory the minute he cites a case
he believes to be "in point."
In light of this paradox, the time is ripe for such a study as this. There
will follow an analysis of the opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court for
the period from January 1, 1951, through December 31, 1955.2 Perhaps
surprisingly, proof will appear in at least partial support of the contem-
porary theories about the judicial process. Then will come a discussion
of some of the discrepancies uncovered in this study and some sugges-
tions for the future.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Throughout each year the lawyers of this country are beset with case
analyses appearing in every law review and loose leaf service. Critical
summaries of the work of the United States Supreme Court are provided
by several of the larger law reviews.3 For us in Ohio the Western Re-
serve Law Review publishes a survey of the decisions of the Ohio Su-
preme Court each spring. Certainly such surveys and analyses are valu-
able but they do not reveal much about the methods used by the various
judges in arriving at their decisions. The purpose of this study is to ex-
amine a doctrine which the judges tell us controls in almost every deci-
sion; that is the doctrine of stare decisis.
John Merryman, of Stanford University, was the first individual to
make such a study as this.4  Professor Merryman examined the various
sources from which a court might draw its authority and analyzed the
value of each. He then tabulated the authorities actually cited by the
California Supreme Court in the year 1950 and compared these with
the sources which seemed to be the best theoretically. The present study
was inspired by this pioneer work, which will be referred to whenever
valid comparisons can be made.
With this brief background in mind an examination of the tables is
now in order. Table I indicates the total number of opinions rendered by
the court during these years, the number of opinions written by each
judge, and the number of times that each judge wrote for the majority
or for the minority.
'This survey covers the cases reported in Volumes 154-164 of the Ohio State Re-
ports.
'The Harvard Law Review and the Minnesota Law Review are two of the more
prominent ones.
'Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954).
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TABLE I
Opinions Published by the Ohio Supreme Court
from 1951 to 1955
Majority Concurring Dissenting Totals
Weygandt, CJ. 74 3 22 99
Bell, J. 17 0 5 22
Hart, J. 82 9 19 110
Lamneck, J. 20 3 0 23
Matthias, J. 56 5 7 68
Middleton, J. 72 2 16 90
Stewart J. 87 4 16 107
Taft, J. 85 33 31 149
Zimmerman, J 73 7 18 98
Montgomery, J. 1 0 0 1
Ross, J. 1 0 0 1
Per Curiam 188 0 0 188
Totals 756 66 134 956
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are tabulations of the authorities cited in the ma-
jority, concurring and dissenting opinions during the five year period.
Table 5 is a compilation of the treatises and other secondary authority
cited by any member of the court during the period in question.
TABLE 2
Authorities Cited in the Majority Opinions
Number of Cases Distinguisbed* Contrary*
Number of Cases 845
Ohio Supreme Court 2,446 206 30
Lower Ohio Courts 53 2 2
Ohio Constitution 96
Statutes 618
Foreign Courts 883 39 57
United States Sup. Court 181 13 4
United States Const. 5
Lower Federal Courts 76 6 1
Legal Texts 142 1
Restatements 22
Law Reviews 19
A.L.R. & A.LR. 2d 149 4 11
Ohio Jurisprudence 96 1
American Jur. & R.C.L. 141
Corpus Juris & C.J.S. 93
Administrative Boards 7
Non-legal Texts 10 1
* These cases were distinguished and not followed.
*These cases were recognized to be contrary to the majority view and therefore
were not followed.
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TABLE 3
Authorities Cited in the Concurring Opinions
Majority Concurring Dissenting
No. of Cases 57
Ohio Sup. Ct. 149 13 3
Ohio Lower Ct. 0
Ohio Const. 5
Statutes 27
Foreign Cts. 19
U.S. Sup. Ct. 4
U.S. Const. 0
Lower Fed. Cts. 2
Texts (legal) 3
Restatements 0
Law Reviews 1
A.L.R. 5
Ohio Jur. 3
Am. Jur. & R.C.L. 5
C.J. & C.J.S. 0
Admin. Bd. 0
Texts (non-legal) 0
Authorities
M4
No. of Cases I
Ohio Sup. Ct. 2
Ohio Lower Cts.
Ohio Const.
Statutes
Foreign Cts.
U.S. Sup. Ct.
U.S. Const.
Lower Fed. Cts.
Texts (legal)
Restatements
Law Reviews
A.L.R.
Ohio Jur.
Am. Jur. & R.C.L.
C.J. & C.J.S.
Admin. Bd.
Text (non-legal)
Treatises and
By the Majority
Accountant's Handbook.
Accounting for Lawyers.
Anderson on Declaratory
Judgments.
Cited
1ority
16
-85
11
11
59
88
36
0
12
6
2
TABLE 4
in the Dissenting Opinions
Concurring Dissenting
Totals
57
165
0
5
27
20
4
0
2
3
0
1
5
3
5
0
0
0
Totals
116
323
11
11
59
93
36
0
12
6
2
4
20 2(
6
11 11
3 3
1 1
0 C
TABLE 5
Other Secondary Authorities Cited
Angell on Limitations.
Appleman on Insurance Law
and Practice.
Ballentine's Law Dictionary.
Bancroft's Code Pleading (2).
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Bates' Pleading, Practice,
Parties and Forms (2).
Berry on Automobiles.
Bigelow on Torts.
Black's Law of Judicial
Precedents.
Black on Judgments.
Black's Law Dictionary.
Blackstone's Commentaries.
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Auto-
mobile Law and Practice (2).
Bogert on Trusts (4).
Borchard on Declaratory
Judgments.
Boston University Law
Review (2).
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
Britton on Bills and Notes.
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Cincinnati Law Review.
Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations.
Cooley on Taxation.
Cooley on Torts (4).
Cooley's Briefs on Insurance.
Corbin on Contracts.
Couch on Insurance (2).
Davies Ohio Corporation Law (2).
Debates of the Constitutional
Convention.
Demann's Ohio Mechanic's
Lien Law.
DeWitt's Ohio Mechanic's Liens.
Eager on Chattel Mortgages
and Conditional Sales.
Freeman on Judgments.
Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary.
General Accounting.
Harper on Torts (2).
Harvard Law Review (4).
Houser on Ohio Practice.
Jones, Commentaries on Evidence.
Keener on Quasi-Contracts.
Kent's Commentaries.
Lindly on Companies (England).
McQuillin on Municipal
Corporations (8).
Mechem on Agency.
Michigan Law Review (3).
Montgomery's Federal Taxes,
Estates, Trusts and Gifts.
Nelson on Divorce and
Annulment.
New Century Dictionary (2).
North Carolina Law Review.
Ohio State Bar Comment.
Orgel on Valuation Under
Eminent Domain.
Oxford English Dictionary (3).
Page on Contracts.
Page on Wills.
Perry on Trusts.
Pomeroy's Code Remedies.
Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence (2).
Prosser on Torts (2).
Restatement of Agency.
Restatement of Conflicts (2).
Restatement of Contracts (2).
Restatement of Judgments.
Restatement of Property.
Restatement of Restitution (2).
Restatement of Torts (8).
Restatement of Trusts (4).
Rowley's Modern Law
of Partnership.
Schneider's Workman's
Compensation.
Scott on Trusts (2).
Scott's Fundamentals of Pro-
cedure in Actions at Law.
Sedgwick and Wait on
Trial of Tite to Land.
Sedgwick on Damages.
Sherman and Redfield on
Negligence.
Storey on Equity Jurisprudence.
Sutherland on Damages.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction.
Thompson on Real Property (5).
Thompson on Wills (3).
Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant.
Underhill on Landlord and Tenant.
Underhill's Criminal Evidence.
University of Chicago Law
Review (2).
Waite on Sales.
Wambush, How to Use De-
cisions and Statutes.
Warren's Corporate Advantages
without Incorporation.
Webster's Dictionary (3).
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White's Supplement to Thomp-
son's Commentaries on the Law
of Negligence.
Wigmore (15).
Williston on Contracts.
Williston on Sales (2).
Woerner's American Law of
Administration.
Woodward on the Law of
Quasi-Contracts (2).
Words and Phrases (2).
Yale Law Journal.
Yokley on Zoning.
By the Concurrer
Beutel's Brennan N.LL.
Blackstone's Commentaries.
Harvard Law Review.
Thompson on Wills.
By the Dissent
Boston University Law Review
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
Cooley on Torts.
Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations.
Michigan Law Review.
Page on Wills.
Restatement of Torts (2).
UnderhiUl's Law of Wills.
Virginia Law Review.
Wigmore, Evidence.
Yale Law Journal.
As might be expected the decisions most frequently cited were those
of the Ohio Supreme Court. However decisions from other courts were
cited in the following order: courts of foreign states, the United States
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and finally lower Ohio courts. There
were very few citations to decisions of administrative boards.
Excepting the cases having to do with civil procedure, which is essen-
tially a home rule problem, the Ohio Supreme Court cited one foreign
state decision for every two times that reference was had to its own de-
cisions. Apparently the concurrers and dissenters were not as taken with
foreign courts' logic as was the majority, -but they too relied on foreign
decisions in a number of instances.
Treatises were cited very infrequently. However, such works as Ameri-
can Law Reports, Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence and
Ohio Jurisprudence were cited quite often. They rank second only to
the Ohio Supreme Court cases and the foreign state decisions.
Statutes
Statutes and constitutions were included in the tables in order to test
Justice Frankfurter's recent observation that:
... even as late as 1875 more than 40% of the controversies before
the Court were common-law litigation, fifty years later only 517, while
today cases not resting on statutes are reduced almost to zero.!
The tables show that the total number of statutes cited approximates
quite closely the total number of opinions in Table 1, and that Frank-
furter's statement applies to the Ohio Supreme Court as well as to the
United States Supreme Court.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527 (1947).
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IMPLICATIONS oF THE TABLES
In many ways, of course, the tables speak for themselves. For in-
stance, they indicate that although case material was cited quite heavily,
other material was often utilized. Note, for instance, the number of citations
to such works as Ohio Jurisprudence and A.LR. However, there are other
than surface conclusions to be drawn from this study. We need to ex-
amine the kinds of sources which the court purports to use against the
background of contemporary legal thought.
Precedent
All courts to a greater or lesser extent pay tribute to the doctrine of
stare decisis.6 Stare decisis relieves some of the pressure exerted on our
system of law by public opinion. It serves as a substitute for the earlier
magical, mystical theories of classic natural law 7 If judges are to function
properly, goes the theory, they must be limited in some way; they must
be prevented from being arbitrary and capricious. Stare decisis is thought
to provide the limit, but not only do we want our judges to be "fair," we
want also to know what our judges are going to do before they do it. We
want predictability. Again stare decisis seems to satisfy this longing.
Yet today, many people are in doubt that the kind of stare decisis we
purport to use actually fills the bill. A stare decisis consisting alone of
judicial precedent may not provide either restrictions on the judiciary or
predictability of its actions.
It is interesting to note at this juncture that the California Supreme
Court seems to follow a doctrine of stare decisis which consists alone of
judicial precedent. In 1950 that court cited case authority in the follow-
ing order: California Supreme Court, lower California courts, courts of
other states, United States Supreme Court and finally lower federal
courts.8
The citation of these cases in the order just recited indicates that the
California Court follows a doctrine of strict stare decisis, which has been
defined as follows:
'The doctrine of stare decisis has been defined as:
A deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge, made after argu-
ment on a question of law fairly arising in a case, and necessary to its
determination, is an authority, or binding precedent, in the same court or
in other courts of equal or lower rank.
13 MONTANA L. REV. 74 (1952), reprinted from CHAMBERLAIN, STARE DEcIsis
19.
7See: CICERo, DE LEGIBUS, Book I, VI; ST. THoMAs AQUINAs, Part II, First Part,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 90.
8 Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613 (1954).
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Where there is local precedent (in terms of past cases of a par-
ticular jurisdiction), it controls the decision of cases falling within it...
and a series of precedents is almost certain to control?
Many practitioners believe that the Ohio Supreme Court follows this
rule - but note what the practice of that court is. Although the Ohio Court
looks first to its own prior decisions, it will then accept a foreign state
decision before it will consider a case from a lower Ohio court. This is
certainly not in keeping with the rule of "strict" stare decisis.
The basis upon which The Ohio Court relies upon foreign cases as
authority has been stated as follows:
... although the weight of authority outside of this state on a question
of law will and should be considered, its persuasiveness to this court
will depend upon the thoroughness with which such questions have been
considered. 0
Of course this same rule should be applied to all authorities a court
surveys, but it would seem that the court has found a great deal of
"thoroughness" in the opinions of foreign justices. Moreover, in many
instances, the court disregarded the "weight of authority" in foreign states
and stressed the fact that it is the quality of the foreign opinions, not the
quantity of them which is most significant.1
All that has been said about the citation of authority thus far, with
respect to case material, indicates that while the Ohio Court depends upon
its own prior cases it often does not feel bound by them, nor does it often
feel inclined to follow the lower Ohio cases. It would appear, if we
were to stop at this point, that, unlike the California court, stare decisis
in its narrow sense is not the guiding light for the Ohio Court. If it
were, what need would there be for the numerous citations to foreign
state opinions? If there were any Ohio case on the subject, it should
control, particularly if it were an Ohio Supreme Court case. It is inter-
esting to note from the California study that less than Y8 of the total
citations were made up of foreign state decisions. For those of you who
would reply that perhaps the Ohio Court decided a number of cases of
first impression during this five year period, it should be pointed out that
the court decided only seventeen such cases.
The authority cited by the Ohio Supreme Court could lead us to
'Report on the Cincinnati Conference on The Status of the Rule of Judicial Prece-
dent, 14 U. CIN. L. REv. 203, 209 (1940).
"
0Commerce National Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 60, 107 N.E. 2d 120,
123 (1952).
'Commerce National Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E. 2d 120
(1952); and Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, B.P.O.E., 158 Ohio St. 107, 107
N.E. 2d 337 (1952), in which the court recognized that its decision was against the
"weight of authority," but for the sake of "justice," disregarded such authority.
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either of two conclusions. It is possible that the Court is seeking more
than mechanical predictability. The heavy reliance upon foreign deci-
sions gives rise to the inference that our high court is searching for the
"just" result in each case rather than blindly following the holding of
another court simply bceause that court happens to be located in the
State of Ohio. On the other hand, we may have uncovered a decision-
making process which consists of a search and comparison and little more.
It may be that:
Their (the judges') notion of their duty is to match the colors of
the cases at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out
upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable
rule.?
Before we are too hasty with our conclusions, let us study the other
sources upon which the Court has relied.
EXPERT OPINIONS
As Authority
A person reading an opinion can only assume that certain authority
was relied upon because the court thought it applicable and believed it
stated the law correctly. Hence, by including a source within an opinion,
whether it be a primary source or a secondary source, the tribunal has
given that authority prestige, and the probabilities of its being depended
upon in subsequent cases of a similar nature are increased.
Ordinarily, only primary authorities are considered to be sources of
the law; whereas treatises and the like, secondary sources, are not. In
reality, what the courts actually do with secondary sources will be de-
terminative of their status. If a treatise is cited in an opinion and relied
upon, then certainly no one can argue that it is not primary authority.
... if law is to be viewed as a legal process, and if authority is regarded
as the published matter that is actually relied on by a court in its part
of the process, then authority varies in degree but not in kind, and
statutes and cases are more authoritative than any other legal and non-
legal writing, but are no more authority.?
Use of Treatises by Ohio Court
At no time during the 5-year period was a legal treatise criticized,
and only once did the majority recognize a work of this type as being
contrary to the court's decision. Of course, this may be due to the fact
that if there is any disagreement between the court and an author, the
court merely declines to cite such a work.
22CARnozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss, 20 (1932).
"
3 Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 621 (1954).
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There can be no doubt that authors such as Wigmore, Bogert, Davis
and Williston are among the top legal minds that this country has pro-
duced, but strangely enough the number of times that the court cited the
works of these men were few indeed. Particularly surprising is the fact
that only five times in five years did a dissenting judge cite one of these
works. Inasmuch as the dissent professes to champion the more advanced
or better view, it seems hardly possible that only five times in five years
has a dissenting member of the court reached a conclusion similar to one
advanced by these men. Therefore, the only possible condusion is that
the Ohio Supreme Court justices feel that sources other than treatises lend
more weight to their positions.
Similarly, the infrequent use of the Restatements, 22 times by the
majority, twice by the dissent, and not at all by the concurring opinions,
would seem to indicate that the judges of the Ohio Supreme Court hold
these authorities in as low repute as do some of the critics of these
volumes.14
Law reviews are another source of skilled legal opinions which, in the
past, have not been given their true place in the court decision. Accord-
ing to one author, this has been due to the fact that a law review is not
usually ".. . designed for any audience at all. It presents a most unfor-
tunate mess of ill-assorted, heterogeneous articles... [and] in its under-
standable desire for continuity of form, the law review appears to have
completely sacrificed continuity of substance."'15 However, Justice Stan-
ley H. Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals, stated that:
Despite all limitations, law reviews have a vital role to play ...
The law review should be - and it is - more than a training ground
for good positions. It can - and it does - render a real service to
lawyers - lawyers on the bench and in the legislatures, as well as those
in private practice."
This role, of which Justice Fuld writes, is two-fold. The law review
may serve as a repository of case law on a subject; but, more important, it
should serve as an analyst of debated doctrines and the evaluator of pos-
sible trends. In the words of Chief Justice Warren:
Through the writings by the professors and the best of their students,
through the law reviews, the courts are increasingly dependent upon the
law schools for their intellectual capital; that is, for those comments and
essays and books for which only the law schools have the necessary time
"See: Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REv. 582 (1935); Book Review,
32 ILL. L. REv. 509 (1927); Patterson, THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF
CoNTRAcrs, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 397 (1933).
'Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 188 (1955).
"a Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 917 (1953).
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and the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness.... We are indebted
to them for this great service. 7
The law reviews have a significant role to play and are of tremendous
potential value to the court. On the other hand it appears, from a view
of the tables, that the Ohio Court does not value them highly. In fact,
law reviews are cited less often than the Restatements.18
Such works as American Law Reports, Corpus Juris Secundum,
American Jurisprudence and Ohio Jurisprudence, as we have noted, con-
stitute a large segment of the source material cited. The explanation is
two-fold: First, if a court is to do any independent research on any given
point of law, the encyclopedias provide a convenient starting point. Sec-
ondly, these works are cited constantly in the appellate briefs. A tribunal,
because of the time factor, must rely on such works so as to expedite
matters. Insofar as these works accomplish this they are to be com-
mended.
However, the use a court makes of these works in its written opinion
presents a difficult question. The Ohio Court employs the encyclopedia
in two ways: (1) as relators of "the law"; and (2) as repositories of
other cases on the point in question. This latter function need not be
disparaged since it gives the reader a lead to other cases on the subject,
but the former, the citation of such works as being dispositive of "the
law," should be discouraged. Whenever this appears in an opinion the
necessary -inference is that the court has depended upon another's inter-
pretation of a set of cases rather than upon its own reasoning. The
experience and knowledge of a court are entitled to far more weight than
this.
Of these publications, Professor Wigmore wrote a scathing criticism:
. . . in the judicial opinions, the superficial products of hasty hack-
writers, callow compilers, and anonymous editors, are given equal con-
sideration with the weightiest names of true science. This reliance upon
anonymity is always a mark of literary and juristic crudity. Almost
any printed page, bound in law-buckram and well advertised or gratuit-
ously presented, constitutes authority fit to guide the courts'
Wigmores judgment of these works, though somewhat harsh, seems
to be justified. A glance at these books will indicate the anonymity of
which Wigmore wrote. There is little attempt by these "authors!' to con-
structively criticize, weigh or evaluate the decisions recounted therein. On
' Honorable Earl Warren, Convocation Address, reprinted 1956 LAw FoRaui, 279
(1956).
''The only Ohio periodical cited during the entire five-year period was the Cin-
cinnati Law Review. In California, Law Reviews were cited 87 times in one year.
''I WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 8a p. 243 (3rd edr 1940).
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the other hand, the following statement contained in A.LR., indicates
the alleged service rendered by one of these works:
Valuable as are the reported cases themselves - from all jurisdic-
tions-it is the annotations which have made A.L.R. such a valuable
tool to the bench and bar of the country. These annotations are exhaus-
tive on the point of law discussed . . . Here is the lawyer's brief, both
ready-made and tailor-made, prepared by editors skilled in the research
of the law to whom exhaustiveness is the cardinal consideration and who
are backed up by the standing and resources of the publishers.2'
These publications provide the coins for the "slot machine" process of
decision making of which Pound spoke,2 ' and which, he concluded if not
curtailed would ruin our legal system. The man who has the best card
index is not necessarily the wisest judge.
A MORE REALISTIC STARE DEcIsis
When a judge sits down to render a decision in a case, there are
many influencing factors besides stare decisis at work on that judge's
mind. Some of these factors are direct or conscious elements such as
legal and political background, political sympathies, and intellectual and
temperamental traits. Other factors are more indirect such as the judge's
general and legal education, his family and personal associations, and
even his wealth and social position.2
Strict stare decisis is supposed to minimize the effect of these personal
factors in a judicial decision but we have seen from the tables that, even
given such effect, strict stare decisis is not the prevailing guide post in
Ohio. There appears to be a tendency for our court to seek out sources
other than Ohio cases to support its decisions. Thus, we may fairly
conclude that precedent, in Ohio, serves only as an "authoritative starting
point for legal reasoning."23  The question then becomes, how can we
predict the result, having found only the starting point? Unfortunately,
the courts leave this vital question unanswered.
What it comes down to is that the judicial decision is like an iceberg;
only a small fraction of it, the written opinion, shows above the surface.
The major part of the decision is inarticulate since it exists only in the
thought processes of the judge and the changes in these processes which
are wrought by the facts and circumstances present in each case.
20How TO USE AMBRICAN LAW R PORTS ANNOTATED 2 (1951). See also:
Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613, 634-646 (1954).
'Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLtm. L. REv. 605 (1908).
' Haines, General Observation on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922).
' Pound, Report on the Cincinnati Conference on The Status of the Rule of Judi-
dil Precedent, 14 U. QN. L. REV. 324, 329 (1940).
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Apparently, the bench is reluctant to apprise us of the nature of
these inarticulate portions of their decisions, so it becomes the lawyer's
job to ascertain the nature and importance of these factors. Unfortu-
nately, the picking of a man's brain is a very complicated task and one
which even the most highly skilled psychologists have been unable to
master completely. How can a lawyer be expected to explore the mind
of as inscrutable a figure as a judge?
Of course, every lawyer should and most good ones do consider such
things as a judge's temperament; 'background, reputation, etc., as definite
factors in their law suits. On the other hand, much of this is guess-
work and, in the final analysis, the lawyer has no -idea whether the
judge based his decision on sound logic or mere whim and caprice.
The answer to legal certainty then is not to be found in the traditional
views of stare decisis. The only real way for us to know how and why
a judge is deciding a case in a certain way is for him to tell us, for it is
manifestly evident that authority can be found to support either side of
any law suit.
CONCLUSIONS
It is certainly beyond the pale of this artide to recommend the proper
or most acceptable authorities to be cited when trying a case before the
Ohio Supreme Court. Rather, the point of this study is to indicate
that a doctrine which -is as old as the law itself 'is not accomplishing the
purpose which it is meant to, i.e. the guaranteeing of legal certainty.
It is time that the lawyers not only of Ohio 'but of the other 47
states take notice of this situation. Should some new doctrine be em-
ployed as the basis of our adversary system? On the other hand, despite
the fact that a judge can decide a case either way and still support his
position by precedent; may this be the 'best system? These are but two of
the many questions which we should be asking ourselves.
The answers to the questions which I have raised concerning our
legal system must come from the members of the bar, but 'before there
can be any answers there must be more questions. The point of this
study is to raise some questions in the minds of at least a few of the
members of the Ohio bar, and perhaps to incite some further inquiry
not only by Ohio lawyers but 'by lawyers in other parts of the country.
It is only by constantly questioning and re-evaluating the subject of our
expertise that we will keep it flexible and in pace with the times.
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